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5.1  Introduction
This chapter is in four parts. The first describes the most fundamental European 
values as recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EU) and the Treaty of Lisbon. One value that will be discussed in addition to 
those contained in the charter is that of sustainability. While the idea of sustainable 
development was included in previous European treaties and instruments, it has 
been given more emphasis in the Treaty of Lisbon through Art. 3(3) (EU 2007):
The Union … shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming 
at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment (our emphasis).
A brief historical section will explain how many of these fundamental values 
attained prominence. Explanation of what exactly these values mean forms the 
main part of the chapter, followed by a case study section on preimplantation 
diagnostics.
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5.2  Fundamental European Values
Science and technology policies will succeed best if built on strong ethical 
foundations. These foundations are being debated worldwide, and the need 
for effective global governance of science is becoming more and more urgent. 
Given the democratic backing of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon (EU 2007), we shall explore funda-
mental European values and how they relate to science and technology policies 
(Fig. 5.1).
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) was signed on 7 
December 2000. Importantly, the charter is legally binding. This was achieved by 
incorporating a reference to the charter into a binding treaty. Article 6(1) of the 
Treaty of Lisbon (EU 2007) reads:
The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.
This reference to ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’ means that the charter 
now forms part of the primary law of the EU, and as a result provisions are 
potentially enforceable through national courts as well as in the European Court 
of Justice (Barnard 2008). (The scope of the charter is specifically aimed at 
institutions of the EU and only applies to member states, when implementing 
EU law.1)
1
 The field of application is addressed in Art. 51(1) of the charter, which reads: ‘The provisions 
of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with 
due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are imple-
menting Union law.’
Fig. 5.1  Main principles of 
the charter of fundamental 
rights and the treaty on the 
European Union
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5.3  European Enlightenment
The European Enlightenment was broadly coextensive with the 18th century. The 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) described it as a process of mov-
ing from superstition, unawareness and blind belief in authorities to progress for 
humanity through the power of reason (Kant 1990). The term ‘Enlightenment’ is thus 
generally used in Europe to describe a process of liberation from traditions, institu-
tions, conventions and norms that could not be rationally justified. Essential ideas 
associated with this period include the convictions that mastery over nature will lead 
to the advancement of humanity, that tolerance is a virtue of states needed to main-
tain public order and that human beings can be perfected through education (Mickel 
1986). Amartya Sen summarizes the European Enlightenment as an ‘intellectual cli-
mate … with [an] interest in reasoned construction of social order’ (Sen 2000).
Common to all ideas of the Enlightenment is the core belief that human rea-
son and not religious or state authority ought to decide on the norms of ethical, 
political and social action as well as the differences between truth and error. As a 
result, some of the values now found in the EU Charter rose to prominence when 
authoritarian regimes were challenged, especially on questions of freedoms, citi-
zens’ rights, solidarity and equality. This was particularly obvious in the French 
Revolution of 1789, with its rallying cry of ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’ [Liberty, 
equality, brotherhood].
Immanuel Kant was an exceptionally important figure in the European 
Enlightenment (Hampson 1982), and he has most often been credited as the father 
of human rights in their modern sense. In the West, the history of human rights is 
often told in two different ways. The first takes an inclusive approach, and claims 
that human rights are based on universal beliefs that can be traced back to most 
religions (Hampson 1982). For instance, believers in Islam have issued a Universal 
Declaration of Islamic Human Rights containing 23 rights, including the right to 
a fair trial, the right to protection against torture and the right to social security 
(Islamic Council 1981).
On the other hand, ‘Islam stresses the submission of the individual to Allah [as] 
God has rights, people do not…’ (Dalacoura 2005). This statement clearly con-
tradicts both the idea of individual human rights and the European Enlightenment 
belief that one should question religious authorities. Likewise, Buddhism seems 
incompatible with rights assigned to autonomous individuals, given that it ‘denies 
the very idea of autonomy, continuity and authenticity of the self’ (Chan 2005a). 
Similarly, Confucianism and its focus on virtue (the attainment of ren being the 
most perfect of virtues) links better to ideas of ethics of obligations than to rights; 
in particular, obligations to respect and care for others (Chan 2005b).
The second approach maintains from the start that the idea of human rights is 
of Western origin, usually credited to the Enlightenment and specifically to John 
Locke (1632–1704) and Immanuel Kant (1727–1804).
Analyses of the historical predecessors of the contemporary theory of human 
rights typically accord a high degree of importance to Locke’s contribution. 
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Certainly, Locke provided the precedent of establishing legitimate political author-
ity upon a rights foundation. This is undeniably an essential component of human 
rights. However, while the philosophically adequate completion of a theoretical 
basis of human rights requires an account of moral reasoning that is consistent 
with the concept of rights, it does not necessarily require an appeal to the authority 
of some superhuman entity in justifying human beings’ claims to certain, funda-
mental rights. Immanuel Kant provides such an account (Fagan 2005).
How does Kant justify his belief in universal human rights—in other words, in indi-
vidual rights irrespective of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc.? For Kant, 
human beings have the capacity to act morally: their ability to separate good and bad 
actions depends on their faculty of reason, and only because they are rational is it pos-
sible for them to decide between right and wrong. This human ability to be rational and 
to make decisions leads to a particular way of looking at the world. As Kant says in a 
famous passage from the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1996):
[B]ut a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical 
reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person… he is not to be valued merely as a 
means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he 
possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from 
all other beings in the world.
In justifying human rights through the human ability to reason, Kant also intro-
duces a value which has since become central to European value systems, namely 
that of dignity. Humans have dignity and possess human rights because of their 
‘rational nature in its capacity to be morally self-legislative’ (Wood 1999). Kant 
therefore based individual, universal human rights on human dignity understood 
as the ability to be self-legislative. (For a broader view of dignity, see below.) This 
is why he is often regarded as the Father of Human Rights, which are now also 
reflected in the EU Charter.
The value of dignity was given added importance through the horrendous acts 
of Nazi doctors during the Second World War and other harmful, highly exploita-
tive medical experiments. As a result, the 1949 German Constitution now places 
respect for human dignity ahead of all other values, enshrined in Art. 1(1): 
‘Human dignity shall be inviolable’.
When European Enlightenment ideas of the questioning of authorities (politi-
cal and religious), mastery over nature, belief in human progress and individual 
autonomy are combined, it is clear why the development of science and innovation 
has accelerated in the West since the 17th century.
For instance, the optimistic notion of progress was paramount to the devel-
opment of modern science. It is often said that Western philosophers still debate 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, while his scientific assumptions (for instance, 
that the void around the earth is filled with aether) have long since been discarded.
Only with the wider use of nuclear energy and nuclear deterrence (Lehming 
1991) in the 1950s and 1960s, and later with the development of genetically 
modified organisms, was the belief in social progress through science questioned 
among broader populations in Europe. The first European Green parties emerged 
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in the 1970s, and the most powerful—the German Green Party—has been sharing 
government responsibilities since the 1980s either locally, regionally or nationally, 
based on opposition to nuclear power and genetic modification. The value of sus-
tainability derives from this movement, which is active throughout Europe.
In addition to the Green movement’s subversion of an uncritical belief in sci-
ence, it is today widely acknowledged that the European Enlightenment, with its 
emphasis on human progress, human domination over nature and the importance 
of reason, nourished the European colonial enterprise. Indian scholar Sanjay Seth, 
who heads the London-based Centre for Postcolonial Studies, writes (Seth 2011):
Armed with the certainty that it possessed nothing less than universal Reason, Europe 
could proceed with its colonial conquests, no longer principally in the name of bringing 
the true word of god to the heathen, but rather in the name of bringing Enlightenment and 
civilization to the benighted.
While Seth emphasizes that ‘neither the modern age nor Europe has had a monop-
oly on … dogmatism’ (Seth 2011), he notes that the belief in tradition-free reason, 
which does not realize the cultural context of ideals and practices, made colonial-
ism possible.
At the same time, thinkers from different continents continue to stress a key 
idea from the Enlightenment period, namely humanism: the belief that all indi-
vidual human beings are important and deserve respect. For instance, according to 
Nigerian scholar in African Studies M.O. Eze, a ‘peculiar form of African human-
ism’ (Eze 2011) can be identified in the philosophy of Ubuntu. ‘Ubuntu’ is often 
summed up as meaning ‘I am because you are’ and the belief system emphasizes 
‘compassion, generosity, honesty, magnanimity, empathy, understanding, forgive-
ness, and the ability to share’ (Eze 2011). According to this system of thought, 
human beings flourish best through supportive relationships with others.
The new humanism, according to Mexican professor of political and social phi-
losophy Oliver Kozlarek, is a humanism that does not stop at recognizing cultural 
differences in postcolonial times, but instead looks for normative perspectives that 
all humans can agree upon. Importantly, these perspectives need to filter down 
into everyday life and practice (Kozlarek 2011). Once this is achieved, humanism 
will have succeeded in ensuring that human beings flourish in a culturally diverse 
world.
5.4  European Fundamental Values
5.4.1  Justice
The unjust ignore justified rules, exploit others and are enemies to equality, 
according to Aristotle (1985). An earthquake or a hurricane cannot be just or 
unjust, nor can a lion or a monkey. Even a human being, if entirely alone on a 
desert island, cannot be just or unjust. Justice is a principle that requires human 
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interaction. It can characterize agents and their actions, social rules or states of 
affairs (Pogge 2006). Justice is a wide field, and as Rawls (1999) has rightly 
observed:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought. A theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws 
and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished 
if they are unjust.
Among the ethical principles that inform science and technology policy, justice is 
therefore likely to play a major role, given its supremacy as a virtue of social rules 
and institutions. Articles 47 to 50 of the EU Charter deal with justice: they include 
the right to a fair trial, the right to be presumed innocent and the right to propor-
tionate punishment. These rights have no direct relevance to science and technology 
policy; however, it has to be noted that the charter does not use the full scope of the 
justice principle, but is restricted to corrective and retributive justice. These are two 
of four distinct justice subprinciples that philosophers traditionally distinguish.
Of the subprinciples set out in Table 5.1, distributive justice could be especially 
relevant to science and technology policy. For instance, ‘nano-divide’ describes a con-
cern that the gap between the rich and the poor, both within nation states and globally, 
will increase through the use of advanced technologies (Barakat and Jiao 2010):
If global economic progress in producing high-value products and services depends upon 
exploiting scientific knowledge, the high entry price for new procedures and skills (for 
example, in the medical domain) is very likely to exacerbate existing divisions between 
rich and poor (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004, p. 52).
While such concerns can be grouped under ‘distributive justice’ as a subprinci-
ple of justice, they can also be seen as relevant to the principles of solidarity or 
equality.
5.4.2  Solidarity
‘Solidarity’ means mutual support, especially among individuals with com-
mon interests. Solidarity is not as complex and long-debated a principle as jus-
tice. In fact, it does not even appear in Aristotle’s work, nor in Immanuel Kant’s. 






Establishes the fairness or equity of transactions
Distributive justice Deals with the division of existing, scarce resources amongst qualifying 
recipients
Corrective justice Rights a wrong that one has brought upon another, usually through a court 
declaring a remedy to correct the given injustice
Retributive justice Establishes which punishment is appropriate for any given crime
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However, it has become a much debated topic in bioethics, with some arguing 
that solidarity is a value that characterizes continental European welfare states as 
opposed to Anglo-American states, which rather focus on individual autonomy 
(Habermas 2003; Bayertz 1998; Hermerén 2008). As a group of Dutch researchers 
put it (Hoedemaekers et al. 2007):
In a number of European welfare states altruistic solidarity as a commitment to help or 
support the needy and disadvantaged has been incorporated in their institutions and law. 
We term this institutional solidarity.
This institutional solidarity for the needy and disadvantaged is also part of the EU 
Charter, in Art. 27 to 38. While these articles also deal with workers’ rights, the 
main emphasis is on access to social security and (preventive) health care for all. 
How is this value relevant to science and technology policy?
An example: it has been argued that large-scale genetic research should be 
governed by the value of solidarity rather than the value of autonomy. Chadwick 
and Berg (2001) believe that medical progress depends on research participants’ 
accepting it as their duty to participate in research for the benefit of others Their 
use of the principle of solidarity focuses on duties, while the EU Charter focuses 
on rights. It is clear that such a duty-based use of the principle could have con-
siderable implications for research and development, especially the recruitment 
of research participants or sample donors in medical research. At the same time, 
extended globally, the principle could be used to lobby for capacity building and 
technology transfer in the context of the nano-divide referred to above.
It is worth noting, though, that the solidarity principle as used in the EU 
Charter does not extend to international aid beyond the EU member states. Hence, 
global solidarity is not covered. Here one would have to look at global legal instru-
ments such as the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which calls for international aid to achieve access to health care for all 
human beings based on the premise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that all human beings are born equal.
5.4.3  Equality
Only in logic is the principle of equality straightforward: two items or entities that 
cannot be distinguished are equal. In ethics and political theory, equality is not 
as easily described. Rather than referring to identical entities, the moral value of 
equality refers to equal rights, equal opportunities and equal moral status. It is 
only in this regard that we are all equal. The rights pronounced in the EU Charter 
are a good example: Arts. 20 to 27 are based on the understanding that nobody 
should be discriminated against, because we are all born equal in rights.
Difficulties arise not so much in the legal attribution of rights, but in political 
action. What does it mean in practice to have equal rights? In the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle referred to the formal equality principle, the principle of non-dis-
crimination (1985). According to Aristotle, it does not matter whether a good man 
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steals from a bad man, or a good man rather than a bad man commits adultery: 
only the action counts. Hence, a court would have to ensure corrective and retribu-
tive justice for the bad man and the good man in order to preserve legal equality.
Yet even among philosophers who promote egalitarian policies, the principle is 
not clear. There are four interpretations of what equality means when linked to public 
policies: equality of wellbeing, resources, opportunity and capabilities (Daniels 1990).
Equal concern for the wellbeing of citizens is outcome-focused and tries to 
achieve equal welfare or at least equal preference satisfaction for all. This approach 
does not imply equal treatment, given that some citizens will require more support to 
achieve wellbeing than others (for instance, those with serious disabilities).
This account of equality puts responsibility for citizen welfare onto the government. 
Equality of resources, on the other hand, moves responsibility for welfare onto individ-
ual citizens, provided they are given access to resources. It is then left to them to convert 
these into wellbeing. Likewise, on the policy of equality of opportunity citizens are pro-
vided with the means to obtain certain ends for which they have to strive themselves. 
For instance, equal opportunity policies will provide education to all so that not only the 
wealthy acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to find satisfying jobs. The capabili-
ties approach to equality aims to lift all human beings up to a given benchmark of func-
tioning that allows them to pursue alternative life plans freely chosen.
What is important in all discussions of equality is to be aware of the privileges 
and restrictions ingrained in all societies, for instance the privileges that men enjoy 
versus women in terms of realizing life plans, or the privileges enjoyed by most in 
affluent versus lower income countries. As ‘The World’s Greatest Money Maker’ 
(BBC 2009), Warren Buffett, has noted, ‘If you stick me down in the middle of 
Bangladesh or Peru, you’ll find out how much this talent is going to produce in the 
wrong kind of soil’ (Singer 2009).
5.4.4  Dignity
None of the six values from the EU Charter is as contested, in either scholarly or 
policy debates, as that of dignity. The principle has been described as useless 
(Macklin 2003), arbitrary (Van Steendam et al. 2006), elusive (Ullrich 2003), 
groundless (Rachels 1990), a nebulous drug (Wetz 2004) and without reference 
point (Statman 2000). In fact, the Canadian Supreme Court decided in 2008 that 
dignity was not to be used in anti-discrimination cases any longer as it was ‘con-
fusing and difficult to apply’.2 At the same time, dignity is a principle evoked in 
almost all modern constitutions and human rights treaties.
Articles 1 to 5 of the EU Charter summarize dignity rights, which include the 
right to life and integrity of the person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.
2
 R. v Kapp [2008] Supreme Court Canada 41 at §22: ‘[H]uman dignity is an abstract and subjective 
notion that… cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an addi-
tional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.’
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An example of the complexity and difficulty of interpreting what the princi-
ple of dignity means can be given in the context of nanotechnology. When the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) identified the 
ethical questions relating to the development of nanomedicine, its first question 
was: ‘How should the dignity of people participating in nanomedicine research tri-
als be respected?’ (EGE 2007). If one links this back to the dignity rights in the 
EU Charter, one wonders which right could be violated by taking part in nano-
medicine research trials. Certainly not the prohibition against torture or slavery. 
The right to life? But then safety concerns are usually discussed outside of dignity 
debates. The right to integrity of the person? The further explications of this right 
given in Art. 3(2) of the charter are:
In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular:
•	 the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the proce-
dures laid down by law,
•	 the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection 
of persons,
•	 the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of finan-
cial gain,
•	 the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
Looking at the above, it is still not possible to link the dignity concern of the EGE 
to the explicated rights. The reason could be that the concept is used in widely dif-
ferent ways: ‘dignity’ can serve, for example, as a synonym for religious principles 
or in a comment on a person’s manners. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the principle’s 
breadth of application by coupling definitions of common understandings of dig-
nity with illustrative quotations (Schroeder 2008, 2010).
Looking at this range of dignity concepts, it is not surprising that the Canadian 
Supreme Court decided that dignity was too confusing and difficult to apply in 
its decisions. However, the principle plays a supreme role in most constitutions, 
Fig. 5.2  Meanings of dignity
‘A human being … possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts 
respect for himself from all other beings in the world’ (Kant 1996).
‘[T]he Gospel of the dignity 
of the person and the Gospel 
of life are a single and 
indivisible Gospel’ (John 
Paul II 1995).
‘A wreath is much easier bound 
than a dignified head for it 
found’ (my translation: In the 
original German: ‘Ein Kranz ist 
gar viel leichter binden, als ihm 
ein würdig Haupt zu finden) 
(Goethe n.d.)
‘Conducting a public romance may have reduced the dignity of the presidency, but 
Sarkozy is president for an era in which dignity is less important than humanity’
(Tharoor 2008).
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and any attempt at purging such a powerful concept from ethical discourse would 
amount to whistling in the wind, in the view of some legal scholars (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).
5.4.5  Citizens’ Rights
Articles 39 to 46 describe very specific citizens’ rights, ranging from the right to 
vote in European elections to the entitlement to diplomatic support when travelling 
abroad. Given that the whole charter consists of citizens’ rights, it is somewhat 
surprising that the drafters chose these terms. Aside from that, however, what is 
of some interest here is the concept of a right in itself, in particular given current 
debates about the differences between Western and Asian ethical systems.
It has been argued that the Asian approach to ethics is community-based, 
focusing on the recognition of the interdependence of all forms of life on earth. It 
thereby presents ‘holistic harmony’ as an essential feature of its ethics (Sakamoto 
1999). Likewise, in traditional Chinese society, ‘there is less emphasis on indi-
vidual rights, self-expression, and self-determination. In the community, qualities 
such as harmony, function, and responsibility are stressed more than individual 
rights, and familial relationships assume primary importance’ (Ip et al. 1998).
What, then, is a right? Human communities are organized by social rules, many 
of which are encoded in law and administered through courts. These rules can be 
rights-centred or obligation-centred. As early as 1861, John Stuart Mill defined 
rights in a way that is still valid today (Mill 2002):
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to 
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and 
opinion … To have a right, then, is … to have something which society ought to defend 
me in the possession of.
A right as understood in the EU Charter is therefore a claim that individual EU 
citizens have on EU bodies. This claim right is open to each one of the approxi-
mately 500 million people living under EU law. It is centred on the individual, not 
on the community he or she lives in. In the context of science and technology, the 
rights of individuals can be usefully illustrated by way of the field of research eth-
ics in medical research.
To achieve progress in medical research, experiments on human beings 
are necessary. Research ethics is the field that governs how such research must 
be conducted if it is to respect fundamental human rights. These rights are non-
negotiable and cannot be overridden by reference to, for example, the common 
good. Hence, no human being can be involved in research against his or her will. 
Individual rights take precedence over the good of the community in medical 
research. Article 8 of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki reads 
(WMA 1964):
While the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal 
can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.
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5.4.6  Freedoms
Rights and freedoms are closely linked concepts. Western philosophers usually 
distinguish negative freedom from positive freedom. ‘Negative freedom’ describes 
the absence of barriers or external restraint, while ‘positive freedom’ describes the 
powers and resources required to pursue one’s life plans (Berlin and Hardy 2002). 
To be able to move to a different country as a privileged academic is a negative 
freedom, in that nobody stops us from going and no immigration control stops 
us from entering. However, this same ability would be a positive freedom for an 
orphaned child rescued in a war zone and taken abroad for hospital treatment or 
perhaps to stay.
The freedoms given to EU citizens through the charter include broad negative 
rights such as the right to property (Art. 17) and the right to liberty (Art. 6), as 
well as more specific negative rights such as the right to marry (Art. 9) and the 
right to religious freedom (Art. 10). On the other hand, the right to education (Art. 
15) is a positive freedom as it provides resources for individual citizens in order to 
increase their choices in life.
Strict libertarians argue that the state should be minimalist and focus on pro-
tecting negative freedom only (Nozick 1974). However, it is one of the defin-
ing features of Europe, especially continental Europe, that positive freedoms are 
given prominence. This approach can be observed, for instance, in the European 
Commission’s action plan on nanosciences and nanotechnologies. Rather than 
focusing on the negative freedom of researchers to ‘choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work’ (Art. 15), the plan focuses on the positive freedom of 
the public ‘to establish an effective dialogue with all stakeholders’ (European 
Commission 2005) and to take people’s expectations and concerns into account.
5.4.7  Sustainability
The values discussed so far are about people; sustainability is about the environ-
ment. Yet some approaches to environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment are highly people-focused or instrumental (Fox 1996).
Instrumental approaches to the environment value the environment only in so 
far as it is useful for or appreciated by humans. In this regard, concern for the 
environment is only indirect, mediated through a direct moral concern for other 
people. The different instrumental approaches are set out in Table 5.2.
In contrast with instrumental approaches, intrinsic value approaches to the envi-
ronment accept that the environment, independent of humans, has a value in its own 
right. Hence, the concern for the environment is direct. This is set out in Table 5.3.
The emphasis in the Treaty of Lisbon on sustainable development and the pro-
motion of scientific and technological advancement (Art. 3(3)) suggests that the 
European Union’s stance on sustainability and environment is instrumental, in 
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other words people-centred or anthropocentric. The environment is to be protected 
and preserved in order to enable the sustainable use and continued availability of 
valuable resources for the benefit of today’s and tomorrow’s humans.
5.5  Case Study: Preimplantation Genetic  
Diagnosis in Europe
The far-reaching collaboration necessary to form a union of 28 countries has been 
accompanied by the transfer of national competences to EU institutions and, as 
we have seen above, by the codification of shared values. One can find striking 
consensus on certain applications of science and technology, such as the shared 
rejection of eugenic practices and reproductive cloning of human beings, both 
deemed to be in violation of human dignity, according to Art. 3(2) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. However, the European Union is still a constellation of 
more than two dozen member states, each with its own distinct cultures and val-
ues, which also apply to its approach to science and technology and the applica-
tions thereof. In the light of such differences, it is important to keep in mind that 
in spite of the far-reaching collaborative nature of the EU, member states still have 
considerable autonomy in some areas. In fact, the competences of the EU itself 
are strictly limited to those conferred upon it by its member states (Art. 5(1) and 
Table 5.2  Instrumental approaches to the environment
Term Approach
Expansionism The environment is valued instrumentally for its contribution to economic 
growth and there are no limits to such growth
Conservation The environment is valued instrumentally for resources required in farming, 
mining, logging etc., and it needs to be conserved for future use
Preservation The environment is valued instrumentally for contributions to human wellbeing 
(e.g. it is good for physical recreation or a potential source of new medicines) 
and ought to be preserved, including for future generations. By contrast with 
conservation, which focuses on use value, preservation focuses on keeping the 
environment from harm, including unrestrained economic exploitation
Table 5.3  Intrinsic value approaches to the environment
Term Approach
Sentience Entities are intrinsically valuable if they are sentient. This is also called the 
animal liberation approach, and its most famous proponents are Bentham 
(1996) and Singer (1995)
Life Entities are intrinsically valuable if they exhibit a biologically based ‘interest’ 
in maintaining their own integrity—put simply, if they strive to maintain their 
own existence (e.g. a plant will expand its roots until it can reach water)
Holistic 
integrity
Entities are intrinsically valuable if they have self-renewing properties as 
a whole, i.e. if they are autopoietic systems such as ecosystems. The most 
famous proponent of this approach is Leopold (1980)
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(2) Treaty on European Union). This section of the chapter examines differences 
in the understanding of values by way of a case study on preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD).
5.5.1  Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
What is PGD? The Health Council of the Netherlands defines it as ‘the examina-
tion in vitro of an embryo (or an egg cell prior to fertilisation) in order to exclude 
a genetic condition in case a very high risk of that condition is known’ (Health 
Council of the Netherlands 2006). Since PGD takes place prior to transfer to the 
womb, it can only be used in combination with in vitro fertilization (IVF). PGD is 
most commonly used by prospective parents who are carriers of (severe) heredi-
tary diseases, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy or sickle cell disease (Health 
Council of the Netherlands 2006). By using PGD, parents aim to ensure that only 
unaffected embryos are transferred to the womb. PGD is considered ethically con-
troversial in several regards:
•	 The life and moral status of the embryo are not respected by PGD.
•	 IVF and PGD are too burdensome for women.
•	 PGD leads onto a slippery slope towards ‘designer babies’.
•	 PGD can detect genes for diseases that may never develop (e.g. BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 mutations that predispose respectively for breast cancer and ovarian cancer).
•	 ‘Saviour siblings’3 are instrumentalized and treated as a commodity.
•	 PGD can be used for non-medical sex selection, a practice quite common in the 
United States (Dondorp and De Wert 2005; Health Council of the Netherlands 
2006; De Wert 2005; Pennings and De Wert 2003; Brownsword 2005).
The next section briefly examines how PGD is governed in the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Germany.
5.5.2  PGD in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a long history of assisted reproduction. The first baby 
ever to be conceived via IVF was born there in 1978. This event and the rapid speed 
of developments in assisted reproduction led to the establishment of a national 
committee to develop principles for the regulation of IVF and embryology. The 
committee, chaired by philosopher Mary Warnock, concluded in its 1984 report 
that the human embryo should be protected, but research on embryos and IVF was 
permissible as long as appropriate safeguards were respected (Warnock 1984).
3
 A child born specifically in order to secure the health of an older sibling, for instance to pro-
vide matching tissue for a bone marrow transplant.
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In the United Kingdom, PGD is allowed as long as the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority agrees that the condition the parents could pass on to the 
child is sufficiently severe. To this end, the authority has published a list of the con-
ditions it has approved so far. The list is quite extensive, and includes BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 mutations, which predispose to breast and ovarian cancer (HFEA 2014). 
PGD for human leukocyte antigen (HLA) typing as required for ‘saviour siblings’ 
is allowed, but such tests are licensed case by case (HFEA 2014). By contrast, sex 
selection for non-medical reasons is not allowed in the United Kingdom, in terms 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990. Overall, the United 
Kingdom has a rather liberal approach to the application of PGD.
5.5.3  PGD in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands PGD is allowed for the screening of severe hereditary diseases. 
The permitted scope of screening is determined by the ‘Ministerial regulation of 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis’ (Aarden et al. 2009), which is based on the 
Embryo Act (Embryowet) of 2002. Whether or not PGD will be allowed is deter-
mined case by case by the performing clinic. To comply with the Act, the clinic 
has to consider the following criteria listed in the regulation:
•	 the severity and nature of the disease,
•	 treatment possibilities,
•	 additional medical criteria (e.g. whether or not expression of the condition at 
hand could be prevented) and
•	 psychological and moral factors.
The Dutch cabinet intended to allow PGD for prospective parents who were car-
riers of (severe) hereditary diseases with a high likelihood that the disease would 
be contracted by the child. After an intense parliamentary debate in 2008, the 
scope of permissible PGD was expanded to include hereditary conditions, even 
where they might never present as a (severe) disease. The regulation specifically 
mentions the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as examples. PGD for HLA typing 
is, however, explicitly banned in the Dutch regulation, in contrast to the United 
Kingdom, as the ‘new child’ would only be conceived to benefit another child. In 
the Netherlands, as in the United Kingdom, sex selection is strictly limited: there 
must be medical reasons, according to Art. 26 of the Embryo Act. One might say 
that the Netherlands has a moderately tolerant stance towards PGD.
5.5.4  PGD in Germany
Until 2010, PGD was banned in Germany. In particular, the German Embryo 
Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz) of 1990 prohibited any use of human 
embryos created in vitro that did not serve the embryo’s preservation and 
675 Science and Technology Governance and European Values
the establishment of a pregnancy. Although the Act did not explicitly mention 
PGD, several articles were interpreted by academics and policymakers as for-
bidding the technology (Aarden et al. 2009). In July 2010, however, the German 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) ruled that the Embryo Protection Act did not 
establish a ban on PGD. This in turn led to major public and political discussion 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2011).
In December 2011, after an intense political debate, PGD was eventually 
allowed under strict conditions, when the Preimplantation Diagnosis Act 
(Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz) came into force. According to the Act, PGD 
is prohibited in principle, but can be allowed if exceptional conditions are met, 
for instance case-by-case approval by an interdisciplinary ethics commission com-
bined with extensive counselling of the prospective parents. More importantly, 
PGD is limited to (severe) conditions that are highly likely to lead to miscarriage 
or the death of the infant within the first year. This effectively prohibits PGD for 
HLA typing, for the screening of hereditary conditions that might not develop into 
a disease (e.g. BRCA1 breast cancer) or for sex selection for non-medical reasons 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2011). As a result, one can characterize Germany as being 
restrictive towards PGD.
5.5.5  Comparing PGD Dispensations in Europe
Comparing the three EU member states examined above, one sees two common-
alities. First, all three allow PGD in screening for acute life-threatening condi-
tions, and second, they prohibit sex selection for non-medical reasons. However, 
if we look at other (contested) applications of PGD, we see notable differences 
(Table 5.4).
Values are a decisive factor in regulatory choices made regarding PGD in the 
three countries. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, which all fall 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have considerable room to develop 
policies to govern contested science and technology applications.
Table 5.4  Preimplantation genetic diagnosis in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany
PGD applications
United Kingdom The Netherlands Germany
Sex selection for non-medical reasons Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
HLA matching (‘saviour siblings’) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
Cancer predisposition (e.g. BRCA1) Allowed Allowed Prohibited
Acute life-threatening conditions Allowed Allowed Allowed
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5.6  Conclusion
The principles and values recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU and the Treaty of Lisbon constitute the point of reference for all acts by 
bodies of the EU. Hence, they also apply to science and technology policies and 
guidelines.
The EU thus conforms to a human rights framework and culture that prioritizes 
non-negotiable individual human rights over the common good. As the case of 
PGD has shown, member states retain considerable autonomy to develop independ-
ent policies to govern contested science and technology applications, an autonomy 
that is justified through the subsidiarity principle of the charter. However, this prin-
ciple is most certainly not unproblematic, since the autonomy of each member state 
extends beyond its own citizens, due to the free movement of persons and of ser-
vices that is a core freedom of the EU in terms of Art. 26(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (EU 2008). EU citizens of restrictive member 
states can easily travel to more liberal countries to make use of controversial tech-
nologies. Belgium, for instance, has a more liberal policy on PGD (comparable to 
the regulations in the United Kingdom) than its neighbour Germany (see, for 
instance, Centrum voor Reproductieve Geneeskunde n.d.).4 According to a study 
by Leopoldina (the German National Academy of Sciences) PGD is carried out for 
around a hundred German couples every year in one Belgian centre alone 
(Leopoldina 2011). Regulating reproductive tourism is just one unresolved instance 
of uniting differing value systems in the far-reaching collaboration of the EU. 
Given that science and technology developments occur at rapid speed, such regula-
tion will certainly remain a challenge within the union.
4
 See for instance: http://www.brusselsivf.be/genetic-diagnosis-embryo (In English).
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